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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20041023-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review State v. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, 100 
P.3d 267, (opinion attached in Addendum A), which reversed the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea (ruling attached in Addendum B). 
Jurisdiction exists under UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) & 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
During the plea colloquy the trial court was alerted that defendant had recently 
consumed alcohol, but defendant assured the court that he was not under the influence and 
he exhibited no signs of impairment. 
Did rule 11 nonetheless require the trial court to ask defendant how much alcohol he 
had consumed andwhen before it couldfindthat defendant's guilty plea was knowingly entered? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision 
of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). The court of appeals' 
decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, *[f 8, 13 P.3d 576. The 
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed 
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. State v. Corwell, 2005 
UT 28, If 10, P.3d (quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 9, 22 P.3d 1242). "The 
question of' [w]hether the [district] court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness.'" Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute and rule, set forth in Addendum C, are relevant: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1999 & Supp. 2002), and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Charge. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence with priors, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1998 & Supp. 2003). R3-4. 
Guilty plea. On 18 September 2002, defendant pled guilty as charged. R41:10 (a 
copy of the plea hearing is attached in Addendum B). The trial court informed defendant of 
the nature of the DUI charge and what the State would have to prove if he went to trial. 
R41:4-5. Defendant responded, "Yes, sir," when asked if he understood. Id. The court also 
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reviewed the constitutional rights defendant would be waiving by pleading guilty. R41:6. 
Again defendant affimiatively responded, "I understand that." R41:7. When the court asked 
if he was "under the influence of alcohol or drugs here today in court," defendant responded, 
"Ho." Id. 
The trial court next asked defendant if he had had enough time to talk to attorney, 
Tony Miles. Defendant responded that he had not in fact talked to attorney Miles. Id. 
Attorney Miles then stepped forward and informed the trial court that attorney Allen, 
defendant's appointed attorney, had had to leave and that he was "standing in." Id. When 
asked if he had had enough time to talk with attorney Allen, defendant responded 
affirmatively. Id. 
The trial court also asked if defendant was then on parole or probation, which 
defendant denied. Id. The court then explained the potential sentence: a zero-to-five-year 
prison term, a $ 5,000 fine and an 85% surcharge. R41:7-8. When asked if he had any 
questions about the potential sentence, defendant responded, "No, sir." R41:8. 
Finally, the court asked if defendant required more time to discuss the case with 
anyone. Id. Defendant said that he was "in charge of a bunch of livestock on the mountain" 
and that he would "like to have at least a couple of days to, at least two days to get them 
down and find somebody to take care of, take care of the animals" if he pled guilty. Id. The 
prosecutor interj ected that the parties' plea agreement included her request that defendant "be 
taken into custody" that day, "otherwise [defendant] would have been felony on a felony." 
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Id. The prosecutor also expressed concern that defendant had been drinking because she 
could "smell it" on him. Id. 
When the trial court asked defendant about his earlier denial of being under the 
influence, defendant admitted that he had been drinking "earl[ier] [that] morning55 due to a 
"back problem/' but continued to maintain that he was "not under the influence." R41:9. 
Defendant also reiterated his concern etbout having time to find someone to care for his 
livestock. Id. The court said he could make no "guarantee" and asked if that would make 
a difference to defendant's decision to plead guilty. R41:9-10. Defendant said, "Notreally," 
and again requested time to find someone to care for his livestock. R41:10. 
Defendant then pled guilty as charged. Id. Pursuant to the parties' plea agreement, 
the court dismissed another pending DUl charge. Id. The court also had defendant taken 
into custody: "I understand your situation, but this is just too dangerous to leave you out with 
this kind of a situation." R41:14. 
Sentence. The trial court imposed a 0-5 year term of imprisonment on 23 October 
2002. R7. 
Motion to withdraw guilty plea. Defendant timely moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea, alleging that he was "intoxicated at the time the guilty plea was entered." R25. Oral 
argument on the motion was heard on 5 March 2003. R41:5 9-67 (a copy of the hearing is 
attached in Addendum B). Before hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court indicated that 
it had reviewed the videotape of defendant's plea hearing. R41:61. Defense counsel 
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cursorily asserted that defendant "not only had [] been drinking but he was, had been 
drinking a sufficient quantity to be intoxicated and didn't understand what he was doing" at 
the plea hearing." R41:63. The prosecutor responded that the videotape of the plea hearing 
showed that defendant "was definitely coherent and answered [the court's] questions. He a 
[sic], responds appropriately. He doesn't seem to be swaying. There's nothing evident on 
the tape that would support [defendant's] position now that he was intoxicated." Id. 
Following the parties' arguments, defendant was given an opportunity to address the 
court. R41:64. Defendant said that "the officer that was here when I was arrested said[,] 
'[Y]ou've not only been drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years,' and he 
said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and took me downstairs." Id. The court 
responded that the "real question [was] not whether [defendant] had been drinking, but [] 
whether or not [he was] intoxicated, whether [he was] so impaired that [he] didn't understand 
what [he] was doing at the time [he] stood here in court and entered a guilty plea. That's, 
that's the real issue here." Id. Defendant replied that "after [he] sobered up [he] understood 
how [he] messed up," and that he "should have never done that." Id. The trial court observed 
that there was "no doubt that [defendant had] been drinking. . . . But, [] the question [was] 
whether or not [defendant] had consumed so much alcohol that [he] didn't appreciate, [] or 
understand what [he was] doing at the time [he] entered [his] plea[:] And, and that's why I 
looked at the tape again." R41:65-66. 
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Motion to withdraw guilty plea denied. The trial court then denied defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and entered the following findings: 
. . . [A]s I look at the tape I don't see anything on the, the tape that 
suggests to me that you were impaired. And I didn't notice anything at the 
time we took the plea. I mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see 
wavering or, or having trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, you 
seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to you and your answers 
appeared to be articulate and coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had 
something to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your ability 
to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did. 
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. I'm also going to find 
that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing. And you may have 
been drinking, but I just don't think that you were under the influence of an 
[sic] alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of understanding what 
was going on that day. 
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, sir, to withdraw the 
plea. And we'll leave the sentence imposed. 
R41:66 (a copy is also attached in Addendum B). 
Appeal. On appeal, defendant argued "that he was under the influence of alcohol at 
the time he entered his plea; that the trial court failed to adequately ensure that his guilty plea 
was knowing and voluntary after the judge had notice of his alcohol consumption the 
morning of the plea hearing; and that the trial court erred in denying his subsequent motion 
to withdraw his plea." Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, ^  5. A majority of the court of appeals 
agreed with defendant and reversed the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea. Id. at1! 12. The Beckstead majority reversed even though defendant himself had 
assured the trial court that, although he had been drinking earlier that morning he was not 
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under the influence, and even though defendant exhibited no signs of impairment during the 
plea colloquy. Id. at \ 9-11. Notwithstanding the total absence of any evidence of 
impairment, the Becksteadma^oxity refused to uphold the trial court's ruling because the trial 
court had not asked defendant at the plea hearing how much alcohol he had consumed and 
when. Id. at fflf 10-12. Although nothing in rule 11 requires these questions, the majority 
reasoned "such a duty does arise upon the court's becoming aware that a defendant has been 
drinking prior to the hearing or otherwise may be impaired." Id. at \ 10. In the absence of 
this questioning, the Beckstead majority opined that the trial court "did not strictly comply 
with its rule 11 obligations, and should have allowed [defendant] to withdraw his plea." Id. 
at T|ll. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Becks tead majority holds that rule 11 requires trial courts to ask about the amount 
and timing of a defendant's recent alcohol consumption—where such is brought to the trial 
court's attention during the plea colloquy—even if, as here, the defendant assures the trial 
court that he is "not under the influence," and'that assurance is bom out by the defendant's 
lucid plea colloquy performance. The Becksteadmajority's holding is inconsistent with this 
Court's consistent teaching that guilty plea proceedings should not be formalistic. It is also 
unsupported. Contrary to the Beckstead majority, most courts are less concerned with 
formalistic inquiry than with determining whether the record as a whole actually supports a 
finding of non-impairment. In doing so, they commonly rely, as here, on a defendant's 
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assurances of non-impairment that are buttressed by the defendant's plea hearing behavior. 
The Court should therefore overrule Becks teadand correct the majority's departure from this 
Court's policy-based interpretation of rule 11. 
ARGUMENT 
WHEN A TRIAL COURT IS ALERTED THAT A DEFENDANT HAS 
RECENTLY CONSUMED ALCOHOL, AND WHERE, AS HERE, THE 
DEFENDANT EXHIBITS NO SIGNS OF IMPAIRMENT, RULE 11 
DOES NOT REQUIRE THE COURT TO ASK HOW MUCH 
ALCOHOL WAS CONSUMED AND WHEN BEFORE IT MAY 
ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA AS KNOWINGLY ENTERED 
As recounted above, defendant pled guilty to felony DUI. R41:10. Although he 
admitted having consumed alcohol earlier that morning, defendant denied being under the 
influence and he exhibited no signs of impairment. See R41:3-14. The trial court 
accordingly rejected defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea, wherein 
defendant alleged that he was too intoxicated at the plea hearing to know what he was doing. 
See R41:61 -67. In Beckstead, a majority of the court of appeals reversed, holding that where, 
as here, a trial court is alerted that the defendant has recently consumed alcohol, the trial 
court must at minimum ask how much alcohol was consumed and when before it may accept 
the defendant's guilty plea as knowingly entered under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Id. at \ 10. The majority opinion is inconsistent with this Court's repeated 
teaching that the substantive goal of rule 11—that defendants know their rights and 
understand the consequences of their plea—"should not be overshadowed or undermined by 
formalistic ritual." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, U 11, 22 P.3d 1242. See also State v. 
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Corwell, 2005 UT 28, \ 17, P.3d (quoting Visser). Beckstead should therefore be 
overruled. 
Guilty plea standard. "Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the 
entry of guilty pleas." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, U 11. Rule 11 "provides in part, that a district 
court may not accept a guilty plea unless the court finds that the defendant has voluntarily 
entered the plea," and "knows o f the specific constitutional rights he or she is giving up. 
Id. (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), (quotation omitted)). Thus, "'[t]he substantive goal 
of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic 
consequences of their decision to plead guilty.5" Id. (quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ f 11). "To 
accomplish this goal, [this Court] has placed the burden of complying with rule 11(e) on the 
district courts, requiring them to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly 
knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his 
or her constitutional rights.5" Id. (internal quotations omitted). See also State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311, 1313 (Utah 1987). The Court "describe[s] this burden as a duty of 
strict compliance.55 Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ^ J11 (case citation and internal quotation omitted).1 
i 
At the time defendant entered his guilty plea in 2002, a guilty plea could only be withdrawn 
for "good cause." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1999 & Supp. 2002). Utah courts have 
held that failure to strictly comply with rule 11 is "good cause.55 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991). Section 77-13-6 was amended effective May 2003 to 
allow for withdrawal of a guilty plea only "upon a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made.55 Because the amendment became effective after defendant entered his 
plea, this brief cites only to the former statute and applicable case law construing that statute. 
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"Strict compliance with rule 11(e)," however, "does not require that a district court 
follow a 'particular script5 or any other 'specific method of communicating the rights 
enumerated by rule 11. '" Id at 112 (quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88, % 13). Rather, "'strict 
compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is 
omitted and so long as the record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1992)). Further, "[b]ecause strict 
compliance may be accomplished through a variety of means, the question of whether a 
defendant was provided with a sufficient understanding of rule 11(e) rights 'necessarily 
turn[s] on the facts of each case.'" Id. (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore, "the test of 
whether a district court strictly complies with rule 11(e) is . . . whether the record adequately 
supports the district court's conclusion that the defendant had a conceptual understanding of 
each of the elements of rule 11(e)." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ^ f 18. Finally, where, as here, a 
plea colloquy strictly complies with rule 11, there is a presumption that the plea was 
knowingly entered. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 11, 1 P.3d 1108. 
This case. Contrary to the Beckstead majority's view, the instant record amply 
supports the trial court's findings that it strictly complied with rule 11 in accepting 
defendant's guilty plea and that defendant's plea was knowingly entered, even though 
defendant had consumed alcohol earlier that day. See R41:65-66 (ruling); see also R41:3-14 
(guilty plea). As set forth above, defendant was not initially forthcoming about his recent 
alcohol consumption and also responded negatively to the trial court's initial inquiry as to 
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whether he was "under the influence of alcohol or drugs[.]" R41:7. After the prosecutor 
indicated that defendant smelled like he had been drinking, defendant acknowledged that he 
had consumed alcohol earlier that morning for a "back problem/' but also reiterated that he 
was "not under the influence[.]" R41:9. 
Defendant's assertions of non-impairment were consistent with his behavior during 
the plea colloquy. His statements during the colloquy were responsive and appropriate 
throughout. See, e.g., R41:3-14. For example, defendant responded affirmatively when the 
trial court asked if he wanted to waive his right to a preliminary hearing and to enter a guilty 
plea. R41:5. Defendant specifically pointed out that his decision to plead guilty was based 
on "the deal we made with the prosecution." R41:4; see also R41:5. Defendant also affirmed 
that he understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. R41:6-7 
("I understand that"). When the trial court asked defendant if he had had "enough time to 
talk to Mr. Miles (defendant's attorney) about this," defendant appropriately pointed out that 
he had not talked to attorney Miles. R41:7. Attorney Miles then explained to the trial court 
that he was "standing in" for attorney Allen, who had had to leave. Id. The trial court asked 
whether defendant had had enough time to speak with attorney Allen and defendant 
responded, "Yes, sir." Id. Defendant also affirmed that he had no questions about the 
potential sentence. R41:8. 
When the trial court asked defendant if he required "any more time to talk to anyone 
about the case," defendant indicated that he was concerned about "livestock on the 
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mountain/5 for which he was responsible. Id. Defendant said he would "like to have at least 
a couple of days to, at least two days to get them down and find somebody to take care of, 
take care of the animals [.]" Id. The trial court initially responded that defendant would not 
be sentenced that day and thus would have "some time," but the prosecutor interjected that 
"the agreement that [she] had with Mr. Allen was that [she] was going to ask that [defendant] 
be taken into custody today." Id. It was at this point that the prosecutor pointed out that she 
could smell alcohol on defendant's person, and that defendant acknowledged consuming 
alcohol earlier in the day, but reiterated that he was "not under the influence." R41:9. 
When the trial court asked if there was "anything else we need to cover before we take 
the plea," defendant again raised his concern about finding someone to care for his livestock. 
Id. The trial court said it would not "make [defendant] a guarantee," and asked defendant 
if that would "make a difference" to his decision to plead guilty. Id. Defendant replied, "Not 
really[,]" and reiterated that he did not "have anybody to, to take care of [his livestock]. 
That's all, that's all I'm worried about is the cattle." R41:10. Defendant thereafter pled 
guilty to felony DUL Id. The trial court accepted his plea and, pursuant to the parties' 
agreement, dismissed another pending DUI charge. Id. 
Following defendant's guilty plea, the prosecutor requested that he be taken into 
custody, "[otherwise, [defendant] would be out on a felony on a felony and we could have 
just tried that other case next week. I know he wants time to handle this livestock problem. 
But frankly, I think in the interests of safety of the public he be taken into custody." R41:11. 
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Defendant reiterated his request for one or two days to make arrangements for the care of his 
livestock: 
I've got to go, I've got to go out to (inaudible word) valley and find out if I can 
get the co-owner, co-owner to take over his share of them, I guess. I know this 
is, this is . . . I hadn't expected this. I expected to go to Harrisville and (short 
inaudible, away from mic) down there to a Class B misdemeanor, which is 
what they offered me. And (short indecipherable, away mic) right off the top 
of my head I don't know what I'm going to do here. 
R41:11-12. Upon further questioning from the trial court, defendant explained that he had 
no family or friends that could assist him. R41:12. The trial court indicated its concern that 
defendant had committed a DUI offense while he was "out awaiting trial" on a prior DUI: 
"And now you show up in my court drinking. I mean, you are an absolute time bomb, aren't 
you. If I, if I let you go aren't I being a little remiss?"/<i. Defendant responded, "Your 
Honor, all I'm asking is 48 hours (short inaudible, two speakers). . . . And this was part of 
the agreement which I've made with the prosecution, that I'd have time to take care of this." 
R41:12-13. The trial court reiterated its concern about defendant's conduct in committing 
a new DUI while out on bail for a prior DUI: "I'm kind of trying to figure out how, why I 
should let you go is what I'm concerned about." R41:13. Defendant asserted that he was 
"not thinking of [himself,]" and further indicated that he had not driven to court that day. 
Id. After attorney Miles indicated that his understanding of the plea agreement was 
consistent with what the prosecutor had represented, the trial court revoked defendant's bail 
and had him taken into custody. R41:14. Not one to give up, defendant asked unsuccessfully 
for a "furlow for 24 hours, to get out for 24 hours[.]" Id. 
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Analysis. Based on the above summary of defendant's plea colloquy performance, 
"the record adequately supports the [trial] court's conclusion thai [] defendant had a 
conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule 11(e)." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, % 18. 
Defendant's answers were all responsive to the questions put before him. The trial judge, 
who observed defendant's demeanor both at the plea hearing and later on the videotape of 
the plea hearing—at the motion to withdraw hearing—saw nothing in defendant's demeanor 
to make him think that defendant was intoxicated or that his earlier drinking had impaired 
him to the point that he could not understand the plea agreement or its consequences. In 
other words, the trial court's findings, that it strictly complied with rule 11 in accepting 
defendant's guilty plea and that defendant's plea was knowingly entered—even though 
defendant had consumed alcohol earlier that day—are well supported by the record. See 
R41:65-66. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Beckstead majority held that the instant record is 
"insufficient" to support the trial court's findings because no inquiry was made as to the 
amount and timing of defendant's alcohol consumption. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, f^ 
9. Without citing any supporting authority, the Becksteadmajority holds that where, as here, 
a trial court is alerted that the defendant consumed alcohol "just prior to the plea hearing" the 
trial court must probe the timing and quantity of the alcohol consumed in order to strictly 
comply with rule 11. Id. at ^  10. The Beckstead majority further asserts, again without any 
authority, that "[tjhese inquiries represent the minimum inquiry necessary to quantify the 
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defendant's state of inebriation and create an informed opinion as to the defendant's capacity 
to enter aplea.'Vd. (emphasis in original). According to the Becksteadmajority, defendant's 
assurances that he was not under the influence andhis non-impaired behavior during the plea 
colloquy were "insufficient" to satisfy rule 11 because "of the well-known tendency of 
persons to understate their alcohol intake and level of intoxication to representatives of the 
justice system," and because "there is no shortage of cases demonstrating that people with 
alcohol problems are often capable of appearing to be sober when in fact they are not." Id. 
at Tffl 8-9. Neither of the Beckstea d majority's assertions, however, succeeds in undermining 
the trial court's well-placed reliance on defendant's assurances that he was "not under the 
influence," see R41:7,9, because defendant's assurances were buttressed by the trial court's 
own observations of defendant's lucid plea colloquy performance. 
Indeed, other courts routinely rely on defendants' representations of non-impairment 
where, as here, those representations are consistent with the defendants' coherent conduct. 
Moreover, other courts do so, even though they also recognize that the better practice may 
be to identify the drug or intoxicant in question, its likely effects, how much was consumed, 
and when. For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that "[w]hen a 
defendant in a Rule 11 hearing confirms that he is on medication," "the 'better practice' is 
to identify the drug in question, how recently it has been taken and in what quantity, and the 
drug's purpose and effect." Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(quoting United States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 2000)). But, the First 
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Circuit also recognizes that "practical judgments can usually be made[5] and that "[cjourts 
have commonly relied on the defendant's own assurance . . . that the defendant's mind is 
clear[,]" and that "the defendant's own performance in the course of a colloquy may confirm 
. . . his assurances." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 268-269. Thus, although the Savinon-
Acosta court "would have been more comfortable if the district court had been able to 
ascertain the name of the tranquilizer and the quantity" Savinon-Acosta had consumed, 
Savinon-Acosta assured the district court that he was not impaired: "'No. No. I understand 
perfectly.'" Id. at 269. Savinon-Acosta's assurance, together with his lucid performance 
during the plea colloquy—which "bore out [his] claim of clearheadedness"—thus sufficed 
to satisfy rule 11 in that case. Id Accord United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 754 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (upholding Browning's guilty plea where he assured court that his medication 
"had not" "affected [his] ability to think or comprehend" and record was devoid of evidence 
"that his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea was affected by the medications"); 
United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187 (8th Cir.) (rejecting Vaughan's claim that his 
mental condition prevented him from entering a knowing guilty plea where Vaughan had 
"denied that he was under the influence of 'anything, medication or otherwise' that would 
make it difficult for him to understand why he was pleading guilty," and where Vaughan's 
"sworn statements were lucid, articulate, and inconsistent with his claim that he did not enter 
a knowing and intelligent plea"), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1094 (1994); United States v. 
Dalman, 994 F.2d 537,538-539 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding Dalman's guilty plea where, even 
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though he was "taking four different types of pills," Dalman assured court that he understood 
what was happening "'right now'"); Froistadv. State, 641 N.W.2d 86, 95-96 (N.D. 2002) 
(upholding guilty plea where Froistad assured trial court that prescribed medication he was 
taking did not affect his "thinking faculties" and "nothing in the record [] indicate[d] that 
Froistad was confused or unaware of what was taking place during the proceeding"); State 
v. Mink, 805 N.E.2d 1064, 1076-1077 (Ohio 2004) (upholding guilty plea where Mink 
assured trial court "that [his] medication had no effect on his ability to understand the court's 
proceedings"); State v. Ries, 849 P.2d 184, 186 (Mont. 1993) (upholding guilty plea where 
Ries denied taking any medication "at the moment" and affirmed that his "mind" was 
"clear"). 
Courts are understandably less willing to uphold guilty pleas as knowingly entered 
where—unlike this case—the defendants' prior medical history or less-than-lucid plea 
hearing behavior calls for a more probing and clarifying inquiry, which is not conducted. For 
example, the First Circuit remanded in United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588, 591-592 
(1st Cir. 1991), for further findings as to the affect of medication Parra-Ibanez ingested 
where, prior to the plea, Parra-Ibanez "revealed a history of psychiatric treatment and drug 
abuse sufficient to justify a psychiatric evaluation for competency," and also exhibited, post-
plea, a "serious emotional disturbance, including [] attempting] suicide" and experiencing 
"seizures." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269 (distinguishing result in Parra-Ibanez). See 
also United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 562 (4th Cir. 1999) (remanding for the district 
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court to determine whether antidepressants Damon was taking as a result of a recent suicide 
attempt "had the capacity to impair his judgment"), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1170 (2002); 
Szermiv. State, 862 So.2d 935,936 (Fla. App. 2004) (vacating guilty plea where Szermi both 
denied being "under the influence of [] mind altering drugs at [the] time" of the guilty plea, 
and also affirmed that the medications he was then taking "significantly affectfed his] 
reasoning or thinking ability"). 
Additionally, courts have been unwilling to uphold a guilty plea even though the 
defendant's plea hearing behavior suggests no impairment, if—unlike this case—there is no 
on-the-record affirmation from the defendant that he or she was unaffected by a recent 
ingestion of medication. See, e.g., United States v. Rosillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1065 (2nd Cir. 
1988) (vacating guilty plea where trial court failed to elicit a response from Rosillo—whom 
the court knew to have a heart condition—that he was not under the influence of any 
medication); United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43, 46 (3rd Cir. 1987) (vacating guilty plea 
where trial court "failed to pursue the issue of Cole's state of mind," after being informed 
that Cole ingested drugs the night before). 
While there is no "settled rule," the primary concern in all these cases is not so much 
with the "precise names and quantities of drugs" consumed, but rather, with whether the 
record supports a finding of non-impairment. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269. Indeed, 
Savinon-Acosta observes that the First Circuit's case law is "in general terms . . . not unlike" 
that of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in "[] Dalman, 994 F.2d [at] 538-539[], where 
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[Dalman] was unable to tell the district court the names of the drugs he was taking but 
confirmed that he understood what was happening; and his performance in the colloquy bore 
out his assertion." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269. See e.g., Cody, 249 F.3d at 52-53 
(upholding Cody's guilty plea where his "appearance and demeanor as he answered questions 
throughout the colloquy" were consistent with his "assurances" that lithium he was taking 
did not "affect [his] train of thought or anything"); Miranda-Gonzalez v. United States, 181 
F.3d 164, 166-167 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding Miranda-Gonzalez's guilty plea where he 
denied that unidentified pills he took earlier that morning "affected his . . . ability to 
understand [the] proceedings"). 
The courts discussed above thus generally recognize, that while a defendant's 
assertions as to the amount and timing of previously ingested medication or alcohol may be 
enlightening in some circumstances, they are no substitute for a trial court's objective 
assessment of demeanor and responsiveness during a thorough plea colloquy as the one 
conducted here. "Rather than defer to the trial court's firsthand observations of Defendant's 
conduct" during the plea colloquy, however, the Becksteadmajority, "would graft additional 
requirements into the rule 11 colloquy when a trial court is on notice that a defendant has 
been drinking alcohol prior to a plea hearing." Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, \ 20 (Davis, 
J., dissenting). The problem with the Beckstead majority's approach, as pointed out by the 
dissent, is that it "fails to define what those requirements would be or to explain why they 
would be appropriate[,]" or helpful, particularly given the majority's recognition of the 
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"' well-known tendency of persons to understate their alcohol intake and level of intoxication 
when asked by representatives of the justice system.5" Id. Indeed, "[e]ven if there were 
some basis for [the majority's] assertion," it supports the notion that further inquiry into 
[defendant's sobriety, against the backdrop of a thorough rule 11 colloquy," as here, "would 
have revealed little." Id. 
As further observed by the Beckstead dissent, "the majority points out that the court 
'tookno steps to determine [defendant's] level ofintoxication[,]'" but u[t]he majority, [] fails 
to demonstrate a legal relationship between the amount of alcohol consumed by a defendant 
and his ability to make a knowing and voluntary plea." 2004 UT App 338, f 21. Neither of 
the two cases cited by the Beckstead majority for its proposition that "people with alcohol 
problems are often capable of appearing to be sober when in fact they are not," has anything 
to do with issues of competency like that here. See State v. Burradell, 931 S. W.2d 100 (Ark. 
1996) (upholding contempt citation against defendant who appeared in court smelling of 
alcohol and registered a .13 on the breath test, but who displayed no outward signs of 
intoxication); Cole v. State, 493 S.2d 1333 (Miss. 1986) (holding that there was no probable 
cause to warrant blood alcohol test; thus, test result inadmissible). Moreover, the Burradell 
court expressly noted that it was unconcerned with "the effect of intoxication on a 
defendant's competence or the voluntariness of his actions." Id. at 103. 
Finally, "[e]ven if a blood-alcohol level were available" here, the dissent correctly 
points out that "the majority's standard does not demonstrate how a trial court, without 
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relying on observation, could determine when a defendant is so intoxicated that he cannot 
make a knowing and voluntary plea." Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, f 21. Indeed, 
defendant's lucid responses throughout the undisputedly thorough colloquy belie the 
majority's assumption that his non-impairment could not be accurately assessed unless the 
trial court also asked how much alcohol he had consumed and when. See R41:3-14. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should overturn Becks tead. The majority's focus on ritualistic inquiries 
that the trial court did not make, as opposed to demeanor and other evaluative information 
the trial court gleaned from the rule 11 colloquy itself, wholly ignores the focus of the inquiry 
in a guilty plea case—the defendant' s knowledge and understanding—in favor of formalistic 
inquiry. The Court should thus correct the Becks tead majority's departure from this Court's 
policy-based interpretation of rule 11 and its focus on defendants' comprehensive 
understanding of the plea. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 18; Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11; 
Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on / ^ M a y 2005. 
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Utah Attorney General 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Larry Niel BECKSTEAD, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20030217-CA. 
Sept. 30, 2004. 
Background: Defendant moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea to driving under influence of alcohol 
(DUI) with prior offenses. The Second District 
Court, Ogden Department, Ernie W. Jones, J., 
denied motion. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held 
that: 
(1) trial court's reliance on defendant's general 
statement that he was not under influence of drugs 
or alcohol at time of plea hearing was insufficient to 
satisfy its obligations under plea-colloquy rule; 
(2) defendant's outward appearance of sobriety at 
plea hearing was insufficient to satisfy trial court's 
obligations under plea-colloquy rule; and 
(3) trial court's finding that defendant had capacity 
to enter knowing and voluntary guilty plea lacked 
sufficient basis. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Davis, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €=ni49 
1 lOkl 149 Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. 
[2] Criminal Law €=>1158(1) 
HOkl 158(1) Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, appellate court 
applies a "clearly erroneous" standard for the trial 
court's findings of fact made in conjunction with 
that decision. 
[3] Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
In the context of plea colloquies, the ultimate 
question of whether the trial court strictly complied 
with constitutional and procedural requirements for 
entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 
11(e). 
[4] Criminal Law €=^273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Rule governing plea colloquies squarely places on 
trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and procedural requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered. Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e). 
[5] Criminal Law €=^273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Strict-compliance rule for plea colloquies requires a 
trial court to establish (1) that the defendant's guilty 
plea is truly knowing and voluntary and (2) that the 
defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights and understood the elements of 
the crime. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e). 
[6] Criminal Law €^273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's reliance on defendant's general 
statement that he was not under influence of drugs 
or alcohol at time of plea hearing was insufficient to 
satisfy its obligations under plea-colloquy rule to 
ensure that defendant had capacity to knowingly 
and voluntarily enter guilty plea, given that trial 
court was placed on notice that defendant had been 
drinking prior to plea hearing; there was 
well-known tendency of persons to understate their 
alcohol intake and level of intoxication to 
representatives of justice system. Rules Crim.Proc, 
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Rule 11(e). 
[7] Criminal Law €==>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Mere general questions that ask whether a plea is 
voluntary are insufficient under rule governing plea 
colloquies. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e). 
[8] Criminal Law €^273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's outward appearance of sobriety at plea 
hearing was insufficient to 
satisfy trial court's obligations under plea-colloquy 
rule to ensure that defendant had capacity to 
knowingly and voluntarily enter guilty plea, given 
that trial court was placed on notice that defendant 
had been drinking prior to plea hearing; record 
showed that defendant had considerable experience 
with alcohol consumption if not substantial drinking 
problem, in that defendant pleaded to felony drunk 
driving with prior convictions, defendant admitted 
that he had been drinking, and prosecutor could 
smell alcohol, and people with alcohol problems 
were often capable of appearing sober when they 
were not. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e). 
[9] Criminal Law €^>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's finding that defendant had capacity to 
enter knowing and voluntary guilty plea lacked 
sufficient basis, given that trial court was on notice 
that defendant had been drinking prior to plea 
hearing, even though defendant stated that he was 
not under influence of drugs or alcohol and had 
outward appearance of sobriety; trial court did not 
inquire into amount of alcohol that defendant had 
consumed or amount of time that had elapsed since 
his last drink, which was minimum inquiry 
necessary to quantify defendant's state of inebriation 
and create informed opinion as to defendant's 
capacity to enter plea. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e) 
*268 Randall W. Richards, Richards Caine & 
Allen, Ogden, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and Marian 
Decker, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
**1 Larry Niel Beckstead pleaded guilty to one 
count of driving under the influence of alcohol with 
prior offenses, a third-degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code section 41-6-44. See Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44 (1998). Beckstead filed a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that he was 
intoxicated when he entered the plea. The *269 
trial court denied Beckstead's motion, and he 
appeals. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 Beckstead entered his guilty plea on 
September 18, 2002. Pursuant to rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court 
conducted a colloquy with Beckstead. As a part of 
this colloquy, the trial court asked Beckstead if he 
was "under the influence of alcohol or drugs here 
today in court," to which Beckstead responded "no." 
**3 As the colloquy progressed, the prosecutor 
alerted the court that Beckstead had been drinking 
and following exchange occurred: 
Prosecutor: [F]rankly, [Beckstead has] been 
drinking today and a, that concerns me. 
Court: You say he has been drinking today? 
Prosecutor: I can tell he's been drinking. I can 
smell it. 
Court: I thought I just asked you Mr.~ 
Beckstead: Well, it was eairly this morning. 
Court: Well, I just asked you if you had had 
anything to drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you 
said no. 
Beckstead: I'm not under the influence, Your 
Honor. 
Court: Okay. You're nol under the influence of 
alcohol-
Beckstead: No (short inaudible, two speakers) 
this morning. 
Court:-but you have been drinking. 
Beckstead: I have a little bit of a back problem. 
Court: Well, I do too but I don't drink to take 
care of it[.] 
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The court made no further inquiry as to 
Beckstead's potential intoxication and accepted his 
guilty plea. The court did, however, make two 
further references to Beckstead's nshow[ing] up in 
my court drinking," and Beckstead's drinking also 
appeared to play a role in the court's decision to 
take Beckstead into custody following his plea. As 
the court stated, "this is just too dangerous to leave 
you out with this kind of a situation." 
**4 Beckstead filed a timely motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, alleging in part that he was 
intoxicated when he entered the plea. [FN1] The 
trial court held a hearing on Beckstead's motion, 
prior to which the court reviewed the videotape of 
Beckstead's plea hearing. Neither side presented 
evidence at the hearing, although Beckstead made a 
statement wherein he described his experience in 
custody following the plea hearing. Beckstead 
described an officer telling him that, based on 
twenty-five years of law enforcement experience, 
his opinion was that Beckstead was very 
intoxicated. Beckstead also stated that he believed 
he was going to be charged with public intoxication 
following the plea hearing. After listening to 
Beckstead's comments, the court made the 
following statement and findings: 
FN1. Beckstead has abandoned all other 
grounds for seeking withdrawal of his plea, 
and we do not address them here. 
[A]s I look at the tape, I don't see anything on the, 
the tape that suggests to me that you were 
impaired. And I didn't notice anything at the time 
we took the plea. I mean, I didn't see slurred 
speech, I didn't see wavering or, or having trouble 
standing up or talking at all. I mean, you seemed 
to understand all of the questions that I put to you 
and your answers appeared to be articulate and 
coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had 
something to drink, I just don't think that that 
somehow impaired your ability to enter that plea 
on the, on the day that you did. 
So I'm going to find that we satisfied [r]ule 11. 
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case 
was both voluntary and knowing. And you may 
have been drinking but I just don't think that you 
were under the influence of an alcohol to a degree 
that it rendered you incapable of understanding 
what was going on that day. 
The court then denied Beckstead's motion to 
withdraw his plea. Beckstead appeals. 
*270 ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3] **5 Beckstead argues that he was under 
the influence of alcohol at the time he entered his 
plea; that the trial court failed to adequately ensure 
that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary after 
the judge had notice of his alcohol consumption the 
morning of the plea hearing; and that the trial court 
erred in denying his subsequent motion to withdraw 
his plea. "We review a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Blair, 868 
P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993). We apply a " ' "clearly 
erroneous" standard for the trial court's findings of 
fact made in conjunction with that decision.' " State 
v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,^ f 10, 983 P.2d 556 
(quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 
1996)) (other citation omitted). However, "[i]n the 
context of rule 11 colloquies, the 'ultimate question 
of whether the trial court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry 
of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed 
for correctness.' " State v. Hittle, 2004 UT 46,1f 4, 
94 P.3d 268 (quoting Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60 at \ 
10,983P.2d556). 
ANALYSIS 
[4][5] **6 The procedures for entering a guilty 
plea are set forth in rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See State v. Benvenuto, 1999 
UT 60,U 11, 983 P.2d 556. " 'Rule 11(e) squarely 
places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and [r]ule 11(e) requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered.' " Id. 
(quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987)). "This 'strict compliance' rule requires 
the trial court to establish (1) that 'the defendant's 
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary,' and (2) 
that 'the defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights and understood the elements of 
the crime.' " Id. (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 
993, 995 (Utah 1993)). 
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**7 Beckstead's appeal presents the issue of what 
steps a trial court must take to ensure that a plea is 
knowing and voluntary once the court has been 
placed on notice that a defendant has been drinking 
alcohol just prior to the plea hearing. In this case, 
the court relied on Beckstead's assertion that he was 
not under the influence of alcohol, as well as the 
apparent absence of outward signs of intoxication, 
to determine that his alcohol consumption did not 
affect the knowing and voluntary nature of 
Beckstead's plea. Under the circumstances of this 
case, we cannot agree that this was sufficient. 
[6][7] **8 " '[M]ere general questions which ask 
whether a plea is "voluntary" are insufficient under 
[r]ule 11/ " State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 824 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995) (quoting State v. Valencia, 116 P.2d 
1332, 1335 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). Similarly, upon 
being placed on notice that Beckstead had been 
drinking, the trial court's reliance on Beckstead's 
general statement that he was "not under the 
influence" was insufficient to satisfy its rule 11 
obligations to ensure that Beckstead had the 
capacity to knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea. 
This is particularly true in light of the well-known 
tendency of persons to understate their alcohol 
intake and level of intoxication to representatives of 
the justice system. See, e.g., Roylance v. Davies, 18 
Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1967) ("The 
defendant admits to a couple of drinks of whiskey. 
Hardly anyone ever admits to having taken more." 
(Crockett, C.J., dissenting)); see also State v. East, 
743 P.2d 1211, 1211 (Utah 1987) (affirming 
driving under the influence conviction of driver 
who informed police that he had "had a couple of 
beers"); Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 879 
(Utah 1979) (finding fact question on defendant's 
intoxication despite his claim of only having had 
"two beers" three hours earlier). 
[8] **9 Neither is it sufficient that Beckstead 
exhibited no outward signs of intoxication to the 
court at the hearing or on the videotape thereof. 
Beckstead pleaded guilty to one felony count of 
driving under the influence with prior convictions, 
and had another felony count of driving under the 
influence dismissed pursuant to his plea agreement. 
Further, Beckstead admitted that he had been 
drinking prior to the plea hearing, and the 
prosecutor could smell the alcohol. This record 
reflects, at a minimum, a person with some 
considerable experience with alcohol *271 
consumption, if not a substantial drinking problem. 
There is no shortage of cases demonstrating that 
people with alcohol problems are often capable of 
appearing to be sober when in fact they are not. 
See, e.g., Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 
S.W.2d 100, 101 (1996) (involving a defendant 
who appeared at his plea hearing smelling of 
alcohol and registering a .13 on a portable breath 
test but otherwise "display [ing] no outward signs of 
intoxication"); Cole v. State, 493 So.2d 1333, 1335 
(Miss. 1986) (finding no probable cause for blood 
test revealing a blood-alcohol level of .246 because 
"[n]o aspect of Cole's speech, appearance or 
behavior in any way indicated that he was under the 
influence of alcohol"). Accordingly, in light of the 
trial court's awareness of Beckstead's recent 
drinking and criminal history involving alcohol, it 
was insufficient to rely primarily on Beckstead's 
outward appearance to determine that he was 
capable of entering his plea. 
[9] **10 " 'What is at stake for an accused facing 
[punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of 
which courts are capable in canvassing the matter 
with the accused to make sure he has a full 
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence.' " State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1312 (Utah 1987) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 
(1969)). While a trial court is not ordinarily 
required to inquire beyond a defendant's denial of 
drug or alcohol use, such a duty does arise upon the 
court's becoming aware that a defendant has been 
drinking prior to the hearing or may otherwise be 
impaired. Here, the trial court was advised that 
Beckstead had been drinking, and Beckstead 
admitted as much, yet the court made no inquiry 
into the amount of alcohol that Beckstead had 
consumed or the amount of time that had elapsed 
since his last drink. [FN2] These inquiries 
represent the minimum inquiry necessary to quantify 
the defendant's state of inebriation and create an 
informed opinion as to the defendant's capacity to 
enter a plea. Without such supporting facts, the 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
100P 3d 267 
100 P 3d 267, 509 Utah Adv Rep 26,2004 UT App 338 
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 267,2004 UT App 338) 
trial court's finding that Beckstead had the capacity 
to enter a knowing and voluntary plea lacks a 
sufficient basis 
FN2 Recognizing, as we have, that a 
defendant's statements about his or her 
alcohol consumption may not be reliable, 
we do not intend this opinion to limit a 
trial court's ability to employ other means 
to ensure a defendant's capacity in the 
appropriate circumstances 
**11 We conclude that the trial court's knowledge 
that Beckstead had been drmkmg prior to the 
hearing triggered a duty of further inquiry to strictly 
comply with rule 11 Neither Beckstead's 
self-evaluation that he was not intoxicated nor his 
outward appearance of sobriety was sufficient to 
satisfy the court's obligation to ensure that 
Beckstead's plea to this felony offense was knowing 
and voluntary [FN3] Under these circumstances, 
the trial court did not strictly comply with its rule 11 
obligations, and should have allowed Beckstead to 
withdraw his plea 
FN3 A trial court's obligations flowing 
from rule 11 are designed to assure 
fairness and protect defendants, including 
those who choose to consume alcohol 
before a court appearance or even attempt 
to mislead the court about that alcohol 
consumption We note, however, that at 
least one other jurisdiction has found such 
behavior to be grounds for exercise of the 
court's contempt powers See Burradell v 
State, 326 Ark 182, 931 S W2d 100, 103 
(1996) 
CONCLUSION 
**12 The trial court was on notice that Beckstead 
had been drinking prior to his plea hearing, but took 
no steps to determine his level of intoxication or 
otherwise establish that Beckstead's guilty plea, and 
its accompanying waiver of constitutional rights, 
was truly knowing Under these circumstances, 
there was an inadequate factual basis upon which 
the trial court could conclude that Beckstead was 
sufficiently sober to enter a knowing plea, and the 
Page 5 
court erred when it denied Beckstead's motion to 
withdraw his plea We reverse the trial court's 
decision and remand this matter for further 
proceedings 
**13 I CONCUR NORMAN H JACKSON, 
Judge 
*272 DAVIS, Judge (dissenting) 
**14 I respectfully dissent Although Defendant 
argues that the trial court failed to satisfy the 
requirements of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure when it accepted his guilty plea, 
Defendant's appeal is in essence a collateral 
challenge to the trial court's entire rule 11 colloquy 
and its later factual finding that Defendant was not 
intoxicated at the time he entered his plea 
xx15 The primary purpose of rule 11(e) "is to 
insure that when a defendant enters a guilty plea and 
thereby waives important constitutional rights, he 
or she acts freely and voluntarily, with full 
knowledge of the consequences of the plea" State 
v Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 11, 1 P 3d 1108 
(quotations and citation omitted) Moreover, 
"[s]tnct compliance with rule 11(e) creates a 
presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered" 
Id 
**16 The trial court clearly complied with the 
explicit requirements of rule 11(e) when it 
conducted a complete plea colloquy and accepted 
Defendant's plea [FN1] By conducting a complete 
rule 11 colloquy, the court was able to evaluate 
Defendant's responses and observe his demeanor 
prior to accepting his plea In addition to the 
dialogue from the plea hearing included m the 
majority opinion, the following colloquy took place 
before the trial court accepted Defendant's plea 
FN1 In his opening brief, Defendant 
acknowledges that the trial court went 
through a complete plea colloquy pursuant 
to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 
© 2005 Thomson/West No Claim to On^ U S Govt Works 
100P.3d267 
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Court: All right. Now, anything else we need to 
cover before we take the plea, Mr. Beckstead? 
Defendant: I just want to have time to get them 
[sic] animals and find somebody to take care of 
them. I'd appreciate that. 
Court: Well, I'm not going to make you a 
guarantee. Okay? Would that make a difference? 
Defendant: Well-
Court: On the plea? 
Defendant: Not really. 
Court: All right. 
Defendant: I am (short inaudible, away from 
mic) 
Court: All right. To the charge-
Defendant:~(short inaudible, no mic) cows. I 
don't have anybody to, to take care of them. I just 
need to get somebody up to take care of them. 
That's all, that's all I'm worried about is the cattle. 
Court: All right. To the charge then of driving 
under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of 
this year, how do you plead? 
Defendant: Guilty. 
Court: All right. I'll accept that plea. 
This extended exchange between the trial court 
and Defendant gave the court further opportunity to 
determine whether Defendant was able to enter a 
knowing plea. 
**17 At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, 
the court was able to review a tape of the plea 
hearing and compare Defendant's demeanor at that 
hearing to his demeanor at the motion hearing. 
After reviewing the tape, the court found that 
Defendant was not intoxicated when he entered his 
plea and that his plea was both voluntary and 
knowing. 
**18 Because the trial court clearly complied with 
the requirements of rule 11, Defendant is 
essentially left with the claim that the trial court's 
finding that Defendant was not intoxicated is 
erroneous. This court will "not overturn factual 
findings supporting a denial of a motion to 
withdraw unless they are clearly erroneous." State 
v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,^ 13, 983 P.2d 556. 
Defendant has not properly challenged the court's 
findings; even if he had, the findings are not clearly 
erroneous. The evidence [FN2] in the record 
supports the trial court's finding that Defendant was 
not intoxicated, and the trial court's findings support 
its decision to deny Defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea. 
FN2. As the majority noted, the trial judge 
reviewed a tape of Defendant's plea and 
stated, "I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't 
see wavering or, or having trouble standing 
up or talking at all. I mean, [he] seemed to 
understand all of the questions that I put to 
[him] and [his] answers appeared to be 
articulate and coherent." 
**19 The majority makes much of the fact that the 
trial court was on notice that Defendant had 
consumed alcohol prior to the hearing; *273 
therefore, according to the majority, the trial court 
had a heightened responsibility to inquire further 
into Defendant's sobriety. Instead of adding new 
requirements to the rule 11 procedure, this court 
should give due deference to a trial judge's ability to 
appraise demeanor evidence. See State v. Hollen, 
2002 UT 35,K 64, 44 P.3d 794. 
**20 Rather than defer to the trial court's firsthand 
observation of Defendant's conduct, the majority, 
without authority, would graft additional 
requirements into the rule 11 colloquy when a trial 
court is on notice that a defendant has been drinking 
alcohol prior to a plea hearing. The majority, 
however, fails to define what those requirements 
would be or to explain why they would be 
appropriate. For example, the majority declares 
that at a minimum, the trial court should have 
inquired into the amount of alcohol that Defendant 
had consumed or the amount of time that had 
elapsed since the alcohol consumption. However, 
at the same time the majority opinion recognizes 
"the well-known tendency of persons to understate 
their alcohol intake and level of intoxication when 
asked by representatives of the justice system." 
Even if there were some basis for this assertion, it 
supports the notion that further inquiry into 
Defendant's sobriety, against the backdrop of a 
thorough rule 11 colloquy, would have revealed 
little. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
100P 3d 267 
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*21 According to the majority, neither 
Defendant's self-evaluation that he was not 
mtoxicated nor his outward appearance of sobriety 
was sufficient to satisfy the trial court's obligation to 
ensure that Defendant's plea was knowing and 
voluntary In concluding that the trial court lacked 
an adequate factual basis to determine that 
Defendant was not intoxicated, the majority pomts 
out that the court "took no steps to determine 
[Defendant's] level of intoxication " The majority, 
however, fails to demonstrate a legal relationship 
between the amount of alcohol consumed by a 
defendant and his ability to make a knowing and 
voluntary plea Even if a blood-alcohol level were 
available, the majority's standard does not 
demonstrate how a trial court, without relying on 
observation, could determine when a defendant is 
so intoxicated that he cannot make a knowing and 
voluntary plea 
**22 I conclude that the trial court strictly 
complied with rule 11 and that it is inappropriate 
for this court to add new and undefined 
requirements to the rule 11 plea colloquy 
Therefore, I would affirm the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
100 P3d 267, 509 Utah Adv Rep 26, 2004 UT 
App 338 
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(September 18, 2002) 
MR. MILES: Your Honor, there's one other matter 
that Camille has that we could, Larry Beckstead, 41. 
THE JUDGE: Forty-one? All right. State of 
Utah versus Larry Beckstead, on for the pretrial conference, 
case 1020. 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, in this case a, Mr. Beckstead 
was a, cited on June 22nd of this year with another DUI that 
we weren't aware of until this week. So the state's 
prepared to file that Information in that new case. And 
based on my discussions with a, Mr. Allan, Mr. Beckstead 
would plead guilty to the new case. For some reason he liked 
the facts better in that case. And I'll dismiss the old 
case. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: He's been given a copy of the 
Information. 
MR. MILES: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. MILES: Mr. Allan, Bernie Allan spoke with 
him, and that is our understanding. 
THE JUDGE: Now, do we need to have him waive the 
prelim and all that? 



























THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: — and he'll plead guilty on this 
case, Judge Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you want to read the 
Information or just waive the reading of the Information on 
this new charge? 
MR. MILES: We'd waive the formal reading, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. It looks like the charge 
is driving under the influence of alcohol. Essentially 
alleges on or about June 22nd, 2002 he operated a motor 
vehicle and he had a blood alcohol of .08 grams or greater, 
or he was under the influence or incapable of safely driving 
a motor vehicle. And this is his third or subsequent 
conviction within 10 years. Right? 
All right. And you understand, Mr. Beckstead, 
you're entitled to have a preliminary hearing on this new 
charge? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. I do. 
THE JUDGE: Did you want to waive your right to 
that preliminary hearing? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. Over the deal we 
made with the prosecution. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And you understand what that 
means to waive your right to a prelim? 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 


























DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Does the state have any 
objection to the waiver? 
MS. NEIDER: No objection. 
THE JUDGE: All right. We'll find that he's 
freely and voluntarily waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing. 
Now, he wants to enter a guilty plea on this 
matter. Is that correct? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And I just read to you in 
essence what the Information or what the elements of the 
offense are, Mr. Beckstead. 
If you went to trial on this charge the state would 
have to prove that you were driving a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of 2002 here in 
Weber County, and they would have to show that you had a 
blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater, or you 
were under the influence of alcohol to a degree which 
rendered you incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, and 
they would have to prove that you had at least two or more 
convictions within the last 10 years of driving under the 
influence. 
Is that what you did in this case? 



























THE JUDGE: Okay. Did you want to give me a 
factual basis again for what happened here? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, on the new case a, on the date 
in the Information he was stopped in Harrisville a, and as 
part of their investigation they thought that he a, might be 
under the influence of alcohol. He did eventually take a 
breathalyzer and blew a point .085. 
He does have two prior convictions within the time 
frame. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. And, 
Mr. Beckstead, again you understand that you're not required 
to plead guilty. You're presumed to be innocent. The state 
has the burden of proof here. If you went to trial they 
would have to prove that to what's called beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Do you understand that by pleading guilty you're 
going to give up a number of rights that you have. You have 
the right to what's called a speedy trial by an impartial 
]ury. You have the right to have an attorney represent you 
and, of course, Mr. Miles is here with you today. You have 
the right against self-incrimination. You have the right to 
confront and cross examine witnesses. You have the right to 
have witnesses subpoenaed on your own behalf at no expense to 
you. And finally, you have the right of appeal. 




























guilty here today. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I understand that. 
THE JUDGE: Now, you're not under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs here today in court, are you? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No. 
THE JUDGE: And have you had enough time to talk 
to Mr. Miles about this? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I haven't talked to 
Mr. Miles. 
MR. MILES: Mr. Allan was here and he had to leave 
so I'm standing in. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So you had enough time to talk 
to Mr. Allan about this? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: And you're satisfied with his 
advice? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (No recorded response). 
THE JUDGE: Now you understand we've got this, at 
least the other case set for trial here it looks like on the 
26th, and I understand if you plead guilty that's going to be 
dismissed. Okay. 
Now, are you on parole or probation right now? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Do you understand that this carries a 



























to five years. It also carries a $5,000 fine and an 85% 
surcharge on this offense. Any question about that? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No, sir. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you need any more time 
to talk to anyone about the case? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: If I plead guilty, I'm in 
was charge of a bunch of livestock on the mountain, I have a, 
a camp. I'd like to have at least a couple of days to, at 
least two days to get them down and find somebody to take 
care of, take care of the animals if I do— 
THE JUDGE: You're not going to be sentenced 
today. I'm going to order what's called a presentence 
report so you'll have some time between now and— 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, the agreement that I had with 
Mr. Allan was that I was going to ask that he be taken into 
custody today. 
THE JUDGE: Oh. 
MS. NEIDER: The reason for that was, otherwise, 
otherwise he would have been felony on felony. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: And frankly, he's been drinking today 
and a, that concerns me. 
THE JUDGE: You say he has been drinking today? 





























THE JUDGE: I thought I just asked you Mr. — 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well, it was early this 
morning. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I just asked you if you had had 
anything to drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you said no. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not under the influence, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You're not under the influence 
of alcohol— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No (short inaudible, two 
speakers) this morning. 
THE"JUDGE: — but you have been drinking. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I have a little bit of a 
back problem. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I do too but I don't drink to 
take care of it, so... 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (Short inaudible, away from 
mic) . 
THE JUDGE: All right. Now, anything else we 
need to cover before we take the plea, Mr. Beckstead? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I just want to have time to 
get them animals and find somebody to take care of them. I'd 
appreciate that. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm not going to make you a 



























DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well— 
THE JUDGE: On the plea? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Not really. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I am (short inaudible, away 
from mic). 
THE JUDGE: All right. To the charge— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: — (short inaudible, no mic) 
cows. I don't have anybody to, to take care of them. I just 
need to get somebody up to take care of them. That's all, 
that's all I'm worried about is the cattle. 
THE JUDGE: All right. To the charge then of 
driving under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of this 
year, how do you plead? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Guilty. 
THE JUDGE: All right. I'll accept that plea. 
And then you're going to move to dismiss the other case 
that's pending? 
MS. NEIDER: Yes, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: And that is the case that ends in 
1020. It's also driving under the influence of alcohol. 
MS. NEIDER: Yes, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: All right. We'll accept that plea 
and we'll also dismiss the other case. 
Now, do we need sentencing date on this? 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 


























UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: October 23rd. 
THE JUDGE: October 23rd. Okay. 
All right. Now, do we need to address this 
question of whether or not we leave him out awaiting 
sentencing? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge that was my a, that's what I 
told Mr. Allan that I would be requesting. Otherwise, he 
would be out on a felony on felony and we could have just 
tried that other case next week. I know he wants time to 
handle this livestock problem. But frankly, I think in 
the interests of safety of the public he be taken into 
custody. 
MR. MILES: Your Honor, and I, and I understand 
that she spoke with Mr. Allan. I, I guess we wouldn't be 
asking, from what he indicates it would just be a day or two 
to get arrangements made but— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Just two days, Your Honor. 
MR. MILES: — we'll submit it to, to 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Beckstead, have you got somebody 
else that can take care of your situation? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I've got to go, I've got to 
go out to (inaudible word) valley and find out if I can get 
the co-owner, co-owner to take over his share of them, I 



























I expected to go to Harrisville and (short inaudible, away 
from mic) down there to a Class B Misdemeanor, which is what 
they offered me. And (short indecipherable, away mic) right 
off the top of my head I don't know what I'm going to do 
here. 
THE JUDGE: Now I guess, my question is have you 
got somebody else that can take of your— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Not immediately, no. I've 
got to find somebody. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have family here? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Uh-uh (negative). 
THE JUDGE: Friends? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: My family all... No. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I tell you what, what troubles 
me is the fact that you were out awaiting trial for a DUI and 
then you commit the one you just pled guilty to. And now you 
show up in my court drinking. I mean, you are an absolute 
time bomb, aren't you. If I, if I let you go aren't I being 
a little remiss? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Your Honor, all I'm asking 
is 48 hours (short inaudible, two speakers). 
THE JUDGE: Well, I know what you're asking but, I 
mean— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: And this was part of the 
agreement which I've made with the prosecution, that I'd have 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 


























time to take care of this. 
THE JUDGE: I know. But I'm just a little 
concerned about, I'm troubled over somebody who's awaiting 
trial for a drinking offense, and then you commit a new one 
while you're out there. I mean, I gave you the chance to be 
out free on bail. And now you've committed a new crime. And 
now you show up in my court drinking. And I'm just, I'm 
kind of trying to figure out how, why I should let you go is 
what I'm concerned about. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not thinking of myself, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: What? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not thinking of myself 
because (short inaudible, two speakers). 
THE JUDGE: Well I know that, that's pretty 
obvious. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (Short inaudible, two 
speakers)— 
THE JUDGE: What I'm worried about is those— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: — obligation of— 
THE JUDGE: — people out in Weber County that 
run the risk of having you run into them. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not driving today. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have anything else, Mr. Miles, 



























MR. MILES: Your Honor, I'm a little tied because 
I believe that was what Bernie and her indicated. But I 
know Mr. Beckstead wanted to inquire about a couple days. 
THE JUDGE: Well, Mr. Beckstead, I'm going to 
revoke your bail and have you taken into custody. I 
understand your situation, but this is just too dangerous to 
leave you out with this kind of a situation. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Is there possibly a furlow 
for 24 hours, to get out for 24 hours? 
THE JUDGE: No. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: To take care of this? 
THE JUDGE: No. I've got you scheduled for 
sentencing on October 23rd. 
So you understand, Mr. Beckstead, you could be 
going to prison on this. This is not some misdemeanor 
anymore. You've got so many priors that you've now, you've 
now made it a felony so. Okay? 
All right. We'll see you on October 23rd. 
Okay? 2:00 o'clock. 
We'll strike that trial date then. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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(March 5, 2003) 
MR. LAKER: This is Larry Beckstead, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. This was on, I guess 
there was, it was a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, was 
there not? 
MR. LAKER: Yes, Your Honor. Actually what 
happened was, was that he filed a, a pro se written motion. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: You ruled that that was, was adequate. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: You pulled me out of another court and 
I came over. And apparently you told me to a, to do... My 
recollection was you told me to talk to Mr. Allan about this, 
which I remembered doing. But I did not in a timely fashion 
file a formal motion to withdraw. I have subsequently done 
that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: And so we're here for oral argument. 
I need to let the Court know that a, Ms. Neider and 
I have been downstairs, we've reviewed the tape of the 
plea. I don't know whether the Court has done that as well. 
THE JUDGE: It's right here. Yes, I've looked at 
it. 



























on the tape that a, that, that Mr. Beckstead had been 
drinking. I think Your Honor points that out, I think 
Camille Neider points that out. I think the defendant 
actually points that out. 
I think the question really becomes whether or not 
he was quote unquote intoxicated to the place that he could 
not understand what he was doing. 
In the colloquy to my, you know, what I remember 
hearing is, is that you sort of chewed Mr. Beckstead out 
because he had just got through answering you are you under 
the influence of any alcohol or drugs— 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: — and he said no. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And a, and then Mrs. Neider pointed 
out that he'd, that a, she felt like he'd been drinking. 
And he stated that he had, that he had had something to 
drink. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And you chewed him out because you 
said he'd just, just said he hadn't. And his response to 
you was you asked me if I was, if, if I was under the 
influence, not whether I'd been drinking. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And a, at this point in time he's 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 


























alleging that a, not only had he been drinking but he was, 
had been drinking a sufficient quantity to be intoxicated and 
didn't understand what he was doing. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So your, your thinking is 
what, that he didn't enter a knowing plea, knowingly? 
MR. LAKER: Yes. That's, that's our position— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: — is that he did not enter a knowing 
plea because he was intoxicated at the time. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Ms. Neider, anything you 
wanted to add? I did have a chance to read your response to 
his motion and— 
MR. SNIDER: Judge, I don't think there's anything 
on the tape that shows that it was anything but a knowing and 
voluntary plea. I think that he was definitely coherent and 
answered your questions. He a, responds appropriately. He 
doesn't seem to be swaying. There's nothing evident on the 
tape that would support his position now that he was 
intoxicated. 
And frankly, we're prepared to have Mr. Allan come 
over and testify if necessary, Judge, that it was his belief 
that he wasn't intoxicated. And we can still do that if the 
Court wants. But after reviewing the tape, Judge, I don't 
see that that would add anything other than a, what was there 
and what the Court could see. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
I just don't think there's anything in his motion 
that rises to the level of good cause. We would ask that 
you deny his motion then. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anything else, 
Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: Anything you want to say? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Just that the officer that 
was here when I was arrested said you've not only been 
drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years, 
and he said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and 
took me downstairs. I said do you want to give me a 
breathalyzer (short inaudible, away from mic), because they 
were going to charge me with public intox (short inaudible, 
away from mic). 
THE JUDGE: Well, you know, I think the real 
question is not whether you had been drinking, but as 
Mr. Laker points out whether or not you were intoxicated, 
whether you were so impaired that you didn't understand what 
you were doing at the time you stood here in court and 
entered a guilty plea. That's, that's the real issue here. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: And after I sobered up I 
understood how I messed up, Your Honor. I should have never 
done that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: And the state had promised 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 


























but never came through anyway. But as far as, this is as far 
as I remember, my plea bargain went out the window also 
because I was arrested and intoxicated. 
THE JUDGE: What do you mean by that, I don't— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well, I was supposed to have 
been given some time to get my things together, a couple 
days, so forth and so on. There was mention of a minimum 
jail time. All that went out the, out the door when 
Mr. Allan left apparently. This is what I recall. I'm not, 
you know, when after he left and I pled guilty, the 
prosecutor turned and asked that you place me in custody then 
because I had been, I was intoxicated or had been drinking 
that day. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, the problem I'm having 
is there's no doubt that you'd been drinking. I mean, you 
finally admitted that. Although initially when I asked you 
that at the time of the plea— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well nobody, nobody wants to 
agree— 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: — you know, it's a public 
embarrassment. 
THE JUDGE: But, but the question is whether or 
not you had consumed so much alcohol that you didn't 



























time you entered your guilty plea. And, and that's why I 
looked at the tape again. 
And as I look at the tape I don,' t see anything on 
the, the tape that suggests to me that you were impaired. 
And I didn't notice anything at the time we took the plea. I 
mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or, 
or having trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, 
you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to 
you and your answers appeared to be articulate and 
coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had something 
to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your 
ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did. 
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. 
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case was both 
voluntary and knowing. And you may have been drinking but I 
just don't think that you were under the influence of an 
alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of 
understanding what was going on that day. 
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, 
sir, to withdraw the plea. And we'll leave the sentence 
imposed. 
Now, you do have the right to appeal that— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: We are going to appeal, yes. 
THE JUDGE: — and 30 days— 




























THE JUDGE: — to file a notice. 
MR. LAKER: He has, he has asked me, Your Honor, 
to ask the Court for a post sentence relief, a release 
pending, pending appeal at this time. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, I'm going to deny that 
motion at this time. But you do have 30 days to file an 
appeal s o — 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Can I orally file that right 
now? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. You need it file something in 
writing though within 30 days— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I have. 
THE JUDGE: — but you certainly can put that on 
the record that you want to appeal the ruling. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: Are you going to handle that appeal 
through your lawyers at the prison? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not sure how we're going 
to do this. If you can file an appeal and get it done then 
I'm sure maybe we can have somebody pick it up. I don't know 
how fast I can get the paperwork done in prison and appeal, 
file it, if I can do it in 30 days. 
MR. LAKER: We'll file a notice of appeal. 



























Good luck to you. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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77-13-& Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch. 
16, § 1. 
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State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
-•RULE 11. PLEAS 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant 
waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. 
A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to 
plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to 
make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the 
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the 
plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does 
not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime 
was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, 
that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature 
of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
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(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has 
been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents 
of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement 
has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any 
collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved 
by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that 
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the 
prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be 
approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge 
shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be 
allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the 
court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to detennine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply 
with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002; 
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